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The launching of the EU-USA Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) initiative has coincided with renewed scholarly interest in the broader idea of transatlantic economic operation (Meyer and Barber 2011; Lester and Barbee 2013; de Ville and Siles-Brügge 2013). Although TTIP itself represents the latest in a series of ongoing diplomatic initiatives that can be traced back to the end of the Cold War (Pollack and Shaffer 2001; Pollack 2005), its timing - that is, in the aftermath of global economic crisis against the backdrop of a fundamental shift in the distribution of global economic power - suggests that the intensification of transatlantic economic cooperation at the current juncture is of particular analytical and substantive significance. First, TTIP has been presented by both US and EU policy actors as part of a coordinated effort to revive the economic recovery process, by providing what EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht (2013) described as the ‘cheapest stimulus package you can imagine’. Second, the most recent phase of EU-USA economic cooperation comes at a time when the EU is increasingly characterised in terms of ‘actorness’ and the ability to speak with a ‘single voice’ (Meunier 2005). In a similar view, some scholars refer to ‘economic equivalence’ (Smith 2009) to describe the increasingly symmetrical nature US-EU relations, in economic if not to the same degree security matters. Third, the intensification of EU-US economic cooperation coincides with, and in large measure is in response to, the rise of the so-called ‘BRIC’ economies - China in particular - that is said to threaten the centrality of the transatlantic power axis in the governance of the global political economy. Fourth and closely related to this, the revival of transatlantic economic cooperation comes at a time when the institutional framework inherited from the Bretton Woods economic order - and hitherto synonymous with US hegemony and transatlantic economic cooperation - appears to be increasingly unfit for purpose.

In this paper, we assess the significance of the TTIP initiative by deliberately situating it in the broader context of the changing global order. Understood in these terms, the significance of TTIP, we argue, rests not solely, or even predominantly, in the scale of the proposed economic agreement, but also as part of a wider of political strategy - shared by both EU and US policy actors - to use transatlantic cooperation to lay claim to a broader leadership role in a global system, which is increasingly defined by shifting power configurations and corresponding levels of conflict regarding trade and development norms, policy institutionalisation and global governance itself. In the paper, we begin by charting the origins of TTIP before briefly outlining the main provisions of the agreement and the current (early 2015) state of play in the negotiations. We then examine the prospects for a successful conclusion to these negotiations; and use this as a proxy for assessing the wider political significance of renewed transatlantic economic cooperation in the changing economic order. To do this, the paper identifies two separate, though closely related, policy ‘arenas’ that are either directly or indirectly implicated in TTIP and the wider political prospectus that underpins it. These are, namely: (i) trade and investment; and (ii) financial regulation (a further two – (iii) North-South development cooperation; and (iv) macroeconomic policy coordination and global governance – have also been identified but are not covered in the paper). In these two cases, the paper identifies the key actors, issues and institutions, and assesses the role and significance of transatlantic economic cooperation therein.
 






2. The Road to TTIP 

2.1 Charting transatlantic economic cooperation in the post-Cold War period
Accounts of contemporary transatlantic relations duly begin with the ending of the Cold War, which supposedly signalled the emergence of an international order in which political and economic relations between the US and EU were reconfigured. In the 1990s, this reconfiguration was expressed, inter alia, as constituting a ‘new transatlanticism’ (Peterson 1996), a ‘new era’ of transatlantic relations (Gardner 1997), a ‘post hegemonic’ context (Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996), in which the EU and US were deemed to be of equivalent economic status (Smith and Woolcock 1993). Michael Smith and Martin Woolcock (1993; see also Smith 1998) identified  ‘competitive cooperation’ as the key ordering principle of the post-Cold War order, by which was meant that both cooperation and competition were integral to US-EU bilateral, regional and multilateral diplomacy. Later, Alberta Sbragia (2010) introduced the idea of ‘competitive interdependence’ to the convey the importance the US placed on the EU - and vice versa - as both a key interlocutor and strategic rival, wherein success in negotiations with third parties was measured against the relative economic gains that each was deemed to have achieved through their separate trade strategies.

In substantive terms, the first meaningful initiative came in 1995 with the signing of the New Transatlantic Agenda, designed to promote, among other things, peace and stability through democracy and development, and the expansion of world trade fostering closer economic relations. This led, subsequently, to a framework ‘mutual recognition agreement’ in 1997, covering six sectors. The significance of this framework agreement was, however, judged to be modest; although the 1998 Transatlantic Economic Partnership committed the US and EU to extend the coverage of mutual recognition to other sectors, this rested on a ‘best endeavour’ pledge rather than a legal bound obligation. In the 2000s, moreover, what progress that had been achieved in the 1990s was more or less eclipsed by the transatlantic tensions and disputes that marked the two administrations of G. W. Bush (2001-8). By the time of the inauguration of Barak Obama in early 2009, the onset and subsequent deepening of the global financial crisis underlined, not only the perceived urgency of rebuilding transatlantic economic relations to bolster the multilateral response to the crisis, but also the altered structural context in which the traditional US-EU axis of power was now situated.                  

2.2 The origins, content and negotiations of TTIP 
The origins of TTIP date back to the summit between US President Barack Obama and European Council President Herman Van Rompuy in November 2011. Here it was agreed to set up a High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, led by US Trade Representative Ron Kirk and EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht. The group was asked to identify options for strengthening the US–EU trade and investment relationship and reflect on what should be the content of a EU-US free trade agreement. Its final report, published in February 2013 (High Level Working Group 2013), concluded that the best option was a comprehensive agreement covering a broad range of bilateral trade and investment issues, namely: market access in relation to tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other regulatory issues affecting, in particular, trade in services, investment and government procurement. The report also cited the potential contribution of a transatlantic free trade agreement to strengthening global rule making and multilateral trade disciplines. The recommendations of the High Level Working Group were subsequently endorsed by US and EU leaders, and TTIP was ‘officially’ launched at the 39th G8 summit, held in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, 17-18th June 2013. At the time of writing, there have been several rounds of negotiations, each of which has been accompanied by an ongoing set of tensions and controversies. First, and most obvious, has been the thorny issue of agricultural support alongside the long-running dispute over food standards and consumer safety, based on the different regulatory philosophies on each side of the Atlantic (Financial Times, 24 February 2014). Second, the EU’s attempt to pursue offensive interests in the area of government procurement to gain access for European firms to the lucrative federal and state-level market has come up against the complexities and split competences specified by the US constitution (Egan 2014). A third issue that was controversial for public opinion and for some European governments, first and foremost Germany, was the proposed investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, which would allow foreign investors to bring their disputes with governments before independent panels (Bishop 2014). Those criticising the inclusion of this mechanism in TTIP argued that it would increase the bargaining power of corporations and would weaken the ability of states to safeguard the public interest. A fourth controversial issue was the inclusion of data privacy provisions in TTIP, as advocated by the US, but resisted by the EU on the ground that Europe and the US have different approaches to data protection (Financial Times 4 November 2013). Fifth, during the negotiations, the EU proposed to include a separate energy and raw materials chapter, but the US opposed this inclusion, as these are divisive topics in US politics (Financial Times 27 July 2014). A final contentious issue in the TTIP negotiations was the inclusion of financial services, as elaborated below.

2.3 TTIP and financial services regulation

Since both the US and the EU included financial services in prior free trade agreements, they implicitly recognized that the TTIP accord would also cover this sector, but they disagreed about what to include in the financial services chapter. The US preferred to handle financial services as in prior trade negotiations by including market access issues in the TTIP. But US Trade Representative Michael Froman argued that ‘that nothing we do in a trade agreement should undermine the ability of regulators on both sides to regulate in the public interest’​[1]​ and that regulatory cooperation should be negotiated within ‘existing and appropriate global forums, such as the G-20 and international standard setting bodies, in parallel alongside the TTIP negotiations’.​[2]​ US policy-makers argued that financial regulation was not a trade issue and were concerned that the financial industry in the US would seek to use regulatory convergence with the EU in order to dilute the financial regulation adopted in the US after the global financial crisis (i.e. the 2010 Dodd-Frank act and its enacting measures) (Financial Times, 27 January 2013).

In contrast, the EU wanted to move beyond what had been done in previous trade agreement. In June 2013, the Council of Ministers’ directives for the negotiations of TTIP stated the aims of ‘regulatory harmonisation, equivalence, or mutual recognition, where appropriate’ (p. 13). With reference to ‘sectors of significant importance to the transatlantic economy, including, financial services’ the objectives were ‘ensuring the removal of existing NTBs, preventing the adoption of new NTBs and allowing market access’ as well as ‘common frameworks for prudential cooperation’ (Council of the European Union 2013, p. 13).​[3]​ With the support of the finance industry, EU officials argued that leaving out any discussion of regulation of the financial services industry in the proposed TTIP would be an omission (Financial Times, 27 January 2013). 

In January 2014, the European Commission produced a position paper proposing that regulatory cooperation between the EU and the US should be based on a number of principles. The most important because it unprecedented was the proposal for ‘mutual consultations in advance of any new financial measures that may significantly affect the provision of financial services between the EU and the US and to avoid introducing rules unduly affecting the jurisdiction of the other party’ (European Commission 2014, p. 3).​[4]​ The financial industry on both sides of the Atlantic was keen to have financial services regulation  included in TTIP (see, for example, AFME et al. 2014). 

In May 2014, a (leaked) document produced by the Commission for the EU Trade Policy Committee, revealed that the EU offer did not contain any commitment on financial services reflecting the view that ‘there should be close parallelism in the negotiations on market access and regulatory aspects of financial services. Given the firm US opposition to include financial services regulatory cooperation in TTIP, it is considered appropriate not include any commitment on financial services to the EU’s market access offer at this stage. The situation may change in the future if the US shows willingness to engage solidly on regulatory cooperation’ (European Commission 2014, p. 2). It was clearly an attempt to put pressure on the US to revise their negotiation position on financial regulatory cooperation in TTIP (see also Euractive 13 June 2014). However, the EU’s attempt to put pressure on the US was not very successful because US financial firms and products already had very good access to the EU market under international agreements dating back 20 years. The EU had also made a services offer in a separate multilateral services trade deal, to which the United States is a party, which did include financial services (Reuters, 18 June 2014).

3. TTIP and beyond: the new political economy of transatlantic economic cooperation

3.1 Transatlantic economic relations and the changing global order

Thus far, much the speculation behind and analysis of TTIP has centred on the explicit remit of the negotiations, including the aforementioned controversies. In this section of the paper, we situate these issues within the broader context of transatlantic economic relations, which, in turn, we situate within the even wider structural context of the changing global order. The former European Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandleson (2013), has described the essence of TTIP as to create not ‘a close shop for Europe and North America to serve and suit each other but an open architecture that others can join and emulate’. On this reading, the significance of TTIP can be understood, not simply as an attempt to kick-start the global economy and re-energize the Doha trade talks, but to claim authorship of the entire multilateral trade agenda - which has been significantly scaled back since the collapse of WTO Cancun Ministerial in December 2003 - by redefining the parameters and scope of future multilateral negotiations. The key inference to draw here (if we presume that Mandleson’s reasoning is shared by the current EU Trade Commission and - perhaps - its US interlocutors, too) is that, once concluded, the ambition will be to ‘multilateralize’ TTIP through the WTO, possibly via a (another) re-launch of Doha, or subsequent trade round. To achieve this, however, EU and US trade actors must first confront three sets of emergent realities that have been defined the Doha impasse. First, and most obvious, the launching of TTIP has coincided with, and in large measure can be interpreted as a response to, the rise of the BRICs economies - China especially - that is said to threaten the centrality of the transatlantic power axis in the governance of the global economy. Here scholars have presented the BRICs as a challenge, both individually and collectively, to the Washington Consensus and Bretton Woods institutional order with which these policy norms are closely associated (Ban and Blyth 2013). More tangibly, and specifically related to the global trading system, the rise of the BRICs - as a synonym for the changing distribution of global economic power - has manifested itself in the growing systemic importance, or veto power, of key developing countries, perhaps illustrated most clearly in their rejection of the so-called ‘Singapore Issues’ (investment, competition policy and government procurement) that precipitated the collapse of the Cancun ministerial in 2003 (see Narlikar and Tussie 2004).

The second emergent reality confronting possible EU and US attempts to use TTIP as a means of re-energizing, or even re-imagining, the multilateral trading system is that the long-running stalemate in the Doha negotiations no longer represents a temporary negotiating impasse, but a full-blown institutional crisis (Wilkinson 2015). In other words, the deadlock in the negotiations cannot be reduced to rational-actor bargaining and Pareto optimality, since the sources of North-South conflict have been layered institutionally and historically. A reoccurring theme in the Doha Round has been the belief among the majority of developing county delegations that the developed countries have not yet fulfilled promises made in previous trade rounds - what became known as the ‘implementation issues’ - while at the same time seeking to open up negotiations in new trade areas such as competition policy, investment, trade facilitation and government procurement - what became known as the ‘Singapore issues’ - without first addressing these grievances. The developed countries, for their part, have sought to persuade emerging economic powers such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa to abandon claims to ‘developing country’ status and negotiate as equals. What connects these two contrasting positions is that the WTO - despite its exemplar status as a symbol of the judicialization of world politics - owes most of its institutional norms and decision making procedures to its predecessor, the GATT, which - among numerous other ambiguities – provides virtually no conceptual or legal means to distinguish between the separate obligations of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, what a ‘development’ agenda might consist of and how the contracting parties might contribute to or benefit from it (Heron 2013).

The third emergent reality - which, in many ways, connects the other two - is that the institutional crisis currently afflicting the WTO can also be detected (if not quite to the same extent) in its two sister organisations, the IMF and World Bank. By way of contrast, the G20 - an organization that has only existed in any form since 1999 – has emerged in the post-crisis landscape as the self-styled premier organ of global economic governance. In 2010, the G20’s (subsequently revised) website confidently declared that the organization represented around 90 per cent of global gross national product, 80 per cent of world trade (including EU intra-trade) as well as two-thirds of the world’s population’. The G20’s ‘economic weight and broad membership’, the statement continued, ‘gives it a high degree of legitimacy and influence over the management of the global economy and financial system’ (cited in Payne 2000: 729). Some of the early commentary on the rise of the G20 interpreted it in terms of the politics of cooption, that is, an attempt by the US to reestablish its hegemony by embedding its power in an updated institutional configuration (Beeson and Bell 1999). While this be so. the emergence of the G20 and, more pointedly, the consolidation of its position at the apex of global economic governance since the crisis suggests a more profound shift in the global order. Significantly, the rise of the G20 - and in particular its accommodation of rising economic powers including Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa – has gone hand-in-hand with the willingness of these countries to exercise their political weight, or veto power, in the traditional rules-based institutions of the Bretton Woods system, not least the WTO (see Hopewell 2015). Hence, the contrast in fortunes in the post-crisis setting between the Bretton Woods institutions, on the one hand, and the G20, on the other, is explained best neither through reference to representativeness nor legitimacy, but to institutional form. In other words, it appears that the main reason that the G20 has thrived in the post-crisis setting is precisely because its lacks the ‘deep’ legal and regulatory character of the Bretton Woods institutions, which might otherwise tempter the willingness of states to cooperate. 

Finally, if this reading is correct, it does not necessarily mean that regulatory, rule- or norm-based cooperation will, in future, be more difficult or impossible to achieve. Rather, as Daniel Drezner (2009) has argued, the key trend today is toward regime complexity wherein the proliferation of international rules, standards and regimes continues, but that these processes lack an overarching institutional focal point. This, suggests Drezner (2009: 66), leads to three sets of problems – the first is that the proliferation of rules and standards without an overarching focal point serves to dilute previous institutional commitments; the second is that the proliferation of different regimes and regulatory standards carry with them the potential for conflicting, overlapping and incoherent mandates, which serve to weaken actors’ commitment to implementation and enforcement; the third, most serious problem, is that regime complexity raises the transaction costs for all actors, creating incentives for them to exploit regulatory arbitrage through forum shifting or forum creation. The significance of all this, with respect to the issues discussed in the paper, is that using TTIP to promote global rule making or standard setting through ‘multilateralization’ could end up accelerating a process that the whole enterprise is supposedly designed to counter. 

               
3.1Trade and investment 

In this subsection of the paper, we consider the implications of the changing political and institutional landscape (described above) for the realisation of TTIP (described earlier) - both in the narrow sense of removing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment flows between the EU and US, and the wider sense of providing a template for the future shape and direction of the multilateral trade agenda. As indicated earlier, even in the narrow sense the TTIP negotiations have already run into numerous difficulties across a broad range of fronts - to the extent that the conclusion of even a relatively modest package of measures is far from assured. But even in the event a successful conclusion to the negotiations, policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic have created a potentially sizeable hostage to political fortune, by using ‘best case’ scenarios to persuade sceptical publics of the economic value of the agreement. In the case of the EU, for example, the Commission has used ‘Impact Assessment’ studies (European Commission 2013) to claim that TTIP would produce annual welfare increases of €119 billion for the EU and €95 billion for the US; or, put another way, an increase in annual disposable income for a family of four of €545 in the EU and €665 in the US. Gabriel Siles-Brügge and Ferdi de Ville (2014; cf. Beckert 2013) have described these projections as an exercise in the ‘management of fictional expectations’, by which is meant that, despite the inherent uncertainty surrounding the general equilibrium models on which these figures are based, they are nevertheless presented as ‘objective’, and therefore incontrovertible, evidence of the benefits of liberalization as part of a purposeful and ends-oriented political strategy authored by advocates of TTIP. The key summative point, from our perspective, is that these projected welfare gains are ‘fictional’ to the extent that the trade or regulatory reforms necessary to produce them are either politically or technically difficult, if not impossible, to deliver. The reason for this is that, once TTIP moves beyond the removal of tariffs (which, as Siles-Brügge and de Ville point out, are responsible for only 23% and 11% of the welfare gains flowing to the EU and US respectively, according to the Commission’s own figures), the remaining, non-tariff, barriers to trade become progressively more difficult to achieve. In the case of regulatory harmonisation, there are strong reasons to think that the party with the higher standards - typically the EU in this scenario - would be reluctant to commit because this in effect would amount to an act of unilateral liberalisation, with acute distributional and, quite possibly, politically destabilising effects. Whereas in the case of mutual recognition - thus far the preferred modality in transatlantic economic cooperation - the welfare gains would be significantly reduced, since it would not entail the actual removal of barriers to trade or else the benefits would be strictly limited to firms residing in the EU and the US (Siles-Brügge and De Ville 2014). 

Placed in the wider context, the most politically feasible modality of liberalization - mutual recognition - carries with it, not only lower potential economic benefits, but also is of less significance for the setting of global rules and standards, since by definition mutual recognition cannot be ‘multilateralized’. On this reading, then, the stated ambition of using TTIP as the pretext for (re-) establishing transatlantic economic cooperation at the apex of an emergent system of global economic governance, and the basis for a future multilateral trade and agenda, looks unrealistic. Instead, what looks more likely is that TTIP - if concluded and ratified - will merely add a further a layer of complexity to the global trade system, wherein regionalism and bilateralism have become the dominant drivers of liberalization more or less since the creation of the WTO. According to the most recent WTO​[5]​ estimate, the number of separate preferential trade agreement notified to the organization since 1995 now stands at 604, compared to just 124 for the entire 1948-1994 period. In theoretical terms, these figures suggests that the trend towards regionalism and bilateralism constitutes more than just a temporary ‘blip’ that can be explained according to the interactive effects of multilateralism or as a ‘second best’ policy option (see Mansfield 1998). Instead, the evidence increasingly points to the endogenous sources of regionalism/bilateralism, which are more or less independent of the state of negotiations in the multilateral arena. In the case of Asia, for example, John Ravenhill (2004) rightly points out that the trend towards regionalism was already well under way before the breakdown of the WTO talks in Seattle in 1999 (and well before the collapse of the Cancun ministerial in 2003). Instead, Ravenhill posits three factors propelling Asian regionalism - growing awareness of the weakness of existing regional institutions, demonstration effects and the changing configuration of domestic economic interests – none of which centre on the WTO. 

A key part of Ravenhill’s analysis is that regionalism is, in effect, a ‘first best’ rather than ‘second best’ option, since it allows key economic interests groups and their political supporters to calve out free trade deals while ring fencing inefficient industries. As Ravenhill puts it, this practice constitutes ‘liberalization without political pain’. The emphasis placed by Ravenhill on the preferences of economic interest groups as a key driver of regionalism and bilateralism finds echoes in the work of other political economists who have pointed to the importance of market structures – e. g. imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale (IRS) – in shaping firms’ preferences for regional and bilateral over multilateral trade liberalization (Casella, 1996; Milner, 1997; Manger 2009). The key summative point is that not only are there strong theoretical grounds for thinking that export-oriented firms may favour preferential over multilateral liberalization; the sensitivity of these firms to changes in the trade policies of other countries is also seen as crucial. A final factor to consider when assessing the growth of regional and bilateral over multilateral liberalization is the ‘North-South’ character of many of these agreements. Here political economists (e.g. Shadlen 2005; Gallagher 2008; Heron 2011; Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012; Shadlen and Manger 2013) again point to the independent drivers of preferentialism. But in these cases the key consideration is the way in which the absence of the power-mitigating effects of multilateral institutions (e.g. through issue linkage, coalition building or recourse to derogations and exemptions occasionally available to developing countries) serves to alters the balance of power between the stronger and the weaker trading partner. Hence, for the stronger trade partner, the attractiveness of regional and bilateral vis-à-vis multilateral trade deals is that they offer the opportunity to extract more concessions from the weaker partner at a lower political cost. Whereas for the weaker partner, the higher level of obligation is tempered by the fact that regional and bilateral trade offer the prospects of more immediate market access and other economic benefits that do not necessarily have to be shared with third countries. 

The relevance of all of this for the themes explored in this paper is to reveal the increasingly entrenched nature of regional and bilateral sources of trade regulation – and the degree to which the origins of these agreements cannot be reduced to ‘second best’ policy responses to the stalling of multilateral negotiations. Indeed, TTIP itself offers a case in point. Understood in these terms – and whatever its political feasibility – TTIP is both a symptom and, in the future a potential further source, of regime complexity. What this means is that, in the absence an overarching focal point, the trade norms and standards emanating from the agreement carry the risk of further eroding multilateral trade disciplines, creating further problems associated with overlapping and conflicting or incoherent mandates, and leading to further opportunities for regulatory arbitrage through forum shifting/creation. It is perfectly possible that TTIP’s negotiating mandates will in future be up-scaled and used as negotiating templates in future agreement with third parties, quite feasibly including rising economic powers like Brazil, China and India. But we have already hinted at the political and technical difficulties associated with these mandates, especially once we move beyond the removal of tariffs, to standard setting to regulatory harmonization - difficulties are very likely to become even more apparent as the negotiations proceed.  

3.2 Financial regulation 

 International financial regulation is characterised by regime complexity and the increasing prominence of emerging powers, albeit far less than in trade because the US and the EU have by far the largest financial services sector in the world and are the major trading partners in finance. It is an area in which international cooperation is crucial given the global nature of finance, the potential for regulatory gaps and overlaps and the fact that financial instability does not stop at national borders.  

There is a variety of international (or, rather, transgovernmental) fora dealing with the regulation of different segments of the financial sector, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities Commissions and the International Association of Insurance Supervisor (e.g. Drezner 2007, Singer 2007).​[6]​ These are networks of national financial regulators that as international standard setters by issuing soft law, which is not legally binding and is not subject to international adjudication mechanism (for an in depth discussion of this law and enforcement mechanisms see Brummer 2012). They also act as loci for to promote cooperation and exchange of information. 

Up to the late 1990s, the US had a predominant influence in transgovernmental regulatory fora, given its market size (Simmons 2001, Drezner 2007) and regulatory capacity (Bach and Newman 2004, Posner 2009). Moreover, the EU was often unable to speak with one voice, given its idiosyncratic arrangements for external representation (Muegge 2011) and the different preferences of the member states rooted in the distinctive configurations of their national financial systems and regulatory approaches (Fioretos 2010). Hence, in the past the US had been able to upload some of its domestic regulatory templates, interests and ideas to the international level, as well as to cross load it to other jurisdiction, including the EU (examples abound, see Simmons 2001, Posner 2010).

From 2000 onwards the EU has increased its regulatory capacity and market size in finance through the completion of the single financial market (Posner 2010). Hence, it has become more influential (with several caveats) in international regulatory fora (Drezner 2007, Posner and Veron 2010). This trend has increased after the global financial crisis that originated in the US and hit very hard the UK, a country that prior to crisis had often sided with the US in international and bilateral negotiations concerning financial regulation (Baker 2010, Fioretos 2010).  Hence, on occasions, the EU has been able to upload some of its domestic regulatory templates, interests and ideas to the international level, as well as to cross load it to other jurisdictions, including the US (for some examples, see Posner 2009, Quaglia 2014a, b).

In the wake of the global financial crisis, three main changes have taken place in the global financial architecture suggesting a shift of the balance of financial power towards emerging economies. First, the existing G 20 was ‘upgraded’ by bringing together the heads of state and government in the G 20 Leaders summits, which provided general guidance and political impetus to the reform of international financial regulation. Indeed the G 20 summits between 2008 and 2010 devoted most of their discussions to financial issues, even though the standard setting work was conducted by the existing transgovernmental networks of national regulators. The existing Financial Stability Forum transformed into the Financial Stability Board, which encompassed all G 20 members (unlike its predecessor) and provided some coordination to sectoral standard setter. The BCBS was enlarged from the existing G 10 members to the G 20 members.

Although the broad scope of the post crisis reforms of financial regulation was agreed at the international level in the Group of Twenty (G 20) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the specific content of the new rules was determined at the national level, or the regional level in the case of the EU, whose rules to a large extent provide the framework for national regulatory changes in the member states. From 2008 onwards, the US and the EU have adopted a vast array of new rules in a relatively limited amount of time and several of these rules have had direct or indirect implications for third countries (see, for example, Pagliari 2013). In the vast majority of cases, the transatlantic regulatory cooperation necessary to manage the cross-border effects of these rules was successful and was facilitated by the background work conducted by international and transnational regulatory fora (see Farrell and Newman 2014). However, a handful of transatlantic regulatory disputes, which are defined as disagreements between the US and the EU about the content and/or scope of each other’s regulation, emerged. The EU’s attempt to include financial regulation in TTIP should be seen in this light.    

Trade liberalisation in financial services is dealt with by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and is subject to the so-called ‘prudential carve out’ for domestic regulation to ensure that the opening of markets the agreement is intended to achieve does not jeopardize prudential regulation and supervision. The carve-out allows national authorities not to comply with their GATS commitments if a measure is taken for prudential reasons (such as the ‘protection of investors, depositors, policy holders’, or ‘to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system’)​[7]​ and not with the intent of avoiding GATS obligations (see Key 2000, Yokoi Arai 2009). On the one hand, the liberalisation of trade in financial services requires the reduction or the removal of regulatory barriers to trade in financial services. On the other hand, it is not easy to draw a distinction between regulations that are barriers to trade and regulations that are necessary for prudential purposes (Key 2000).





o	 The successful conclusion of TTIP is far from certain. This uncertainty does not just stem from the usual political intransience but the technicalities difficulties associated with the removal of NTBs – rule setting, mutual recognition and regulatory harmonisation.
o	TTIP is economically and political important, not only for the two contracting parties, namely, the US and the EU, but also for the future of global governance. TTIP is partly a transatlantic response to regime complexity and the changing distribution of global economic power  - although the latter is at this stage more keenly felt in trade and investment than financial regulation.
o	In trade, the drivers of regime complexity - that is, the proliferation of regional, bilateral and ‘mini-lateral’ free trade agreements – are increasingly seen as independent from negotiating impasse in the multilateral trade system.
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^6	  In accounting, the International Accounting Standards Board is a private standard setter (Buthe and Mattli 2010), albeit with some public oversight.
^7	  Paragraph 2 of the Annex on Financial Services of GATS
